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19 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

and in pursuance of the provisions of a present existing treaty of
conmmerce and navigation. Such an alien is therefore not covered
by the quota provision of the law nor by the exclusion of those
ineligible to citizenship. Japanese are therefore admissible without
limitation if they come as traders.
It is true that section 15 of the new law provides that this admission shall be for such time and under such conditions as may be
by regulations prescribed; but what time limits or conditions will be
consistent with a treaty right to carry on a trade, particularly if
resting on mere regulation? The difficulty is enhanced by the usual
treaty provision that the trader may employ agents of his choice; in
view of the history of this provision this would seem to include
agents of his own nationality. Will such an agent be covered by
the provision of section 3? It will take fuither litigation to settle
ERNST FREUND.
this question.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONGRESSIONAL PowER TO AUTHORIZE NATIONAL BANKS TO ACT AS EXECUTOR AGAINST WILL OF
STATE.-In Missouri ex rel. Burnes National Bank v. Duncan,' an
interesting question is decided.
A federal bank statute permits national banks to act as trustee,
executor, or administrator, in any state which permits its own state
banks, trust companies, or other corporations competing with national banks so to act. By the law of Missouri, state and national
banks may not act as executors, but local trust companies 2 may do
so. This law being upheld by the Missouri Supreme Court against
a national bank, the decision was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court in the above case.
It has previously been decided in First National Bank v. Fellows,3 that Congress could authorize the exercise of such functions
by a national bank, at least where not forbidden by the state, as
incidental to the banking functions whose sanction goes back to
McCulloch v. Maryland,4 in order that under modern competitive
conditions the business of the bank might be successful. Seven
judges of the court thought the same reasoning applied even when
the state expressly sought to confine the administration of estates
to local trust companies. Mr. Justice Sutherland, with whom con-curred Mr. Justice McReynolds, thought the administration of
estates a governmental function carried on by state officers-executors and administrators-and that Congress could not control a
state in the choice of its officers, even for such purposes.
Doubtless, the choice of state officials exercising governmental
functions of a character obviously and largely 5public could not be
dictated, even somewhat indirectly, by Congress ; but the duties of
executors and administrators are more characteristically those of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

(1924) 44 S. C. 427.
257 S. W. 784.
(1918) 244 U. S. 416.
(1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
Cf. Lane Co. v. Oregon (1869) 7 Wall. 71.

COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

fiduciaries of private property interests than of guardians of the
public welfare, though the right to act as such, like the right to
inherit property, may 6 e subject to state regulation. The decisicrn
is a sensible one, though not free from plausible logical objection.
The case naturally suggests two related points of importance
upon which the federal Supreme Court has not yet spoken: (1)
May a state confine the office of executor to its own citizens or residents, without violating Article IV, Sec. 2, of the Federal Constitution (the original "privileges and immunities" clause) ? and (2) May
a treaty authorize foreign consuls to administer estates of aliens
against the will of the state where the property is? A number of
state decisions answer (1) in the affirmative, perhaps the leading
one being re Mulford6 ; (2) is also more commonly answered in the
affirmative. 7 In view of the principal case it is perhaps more likely
that the treaty power over the administration of the estates of
aliens will be upheld; and it certainly affords some support to the
position that a state may not discriminate against citizens of other
states in this regard. It has been held that the right to act as8
trustee of local property cannot be confined to residents of a state.
If the right to act as executor, though technically an official position,
is so far from being an essentially public function that Congress
can compel an unwilling state to accept a national bank for the
office, it may well be that such a right is one of the privileges that
a state must allow to citizens of other states on the same terms
as its own. It is certainly a serious hardship to a citizen of California not to be able to appoint a trusted fellow-citizen as his executor of Illinois property, instead of being compelled to rely upon some
relative stranger resident in -Illinois or upon the public administrator;
and the reasons of public policy that can be adduced for it are
more technical than substantial.
JAMES PARKER HALL.

THE NEBRASKA BREAD WEIGHT CASE.-In the case of Jay
Burns Baking Company v. Bryan,' the validity of the Nebraska
standard bread weight law was involved. That law provided that
the standard weights for loaves of bread sold within twenty-four
hours after baking should be one-half pound, one pound, a pound
and a half, or exact multiples of one pound, and that loaves of other
weights should not be sold, except that an excess tolerance of two
ounces per pound was permitted, i. e., a half pound loaf could weigh
not less than eight ounces nor more than nine ounces, a pound loaf
not less than sixteen ounces nor more than eighteen. The weight
was to be determined by computing the average of not less than
twenty-five loaves.
242. See 1 L. R. A. (N. s.) 341, ff. note.
6. (1905) 217 Ill.
7. Wyman, Petitioter (1906) 191 Mass. 276, and cases cited in Rocca v.
Thompson (1912) 223 U. S. 317, 326-7 (which left the question open).
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